source: openssl/trunk/ssl/s3_pkt.c@ 808

Last change on this file since 808 was 808, checked in by dmik, 11 years ago

openssl: Merge version 1.0.0n from vendor to trunk.
File size: 41.5 KB
Line 
1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <limits.h>
114#include <errno.h>
115#define USE_SOCKETS
116#include "ssl_locl.h"
117#include <openssl/evp.h>
118#include <openssl/buffer.h>
119
120static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
125 {
126 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
127 * packet by another n bytes.
128 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
129 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
130 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
131 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
132 */
133 int i,len,left;
134 long align=0;
135 unsigned char *pkt;
136 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
137
138 if (n <= 0) return n;
139
140 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
141 if (rb->buf == NULL)
142 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
143 return -1;
144
145 left = rb->left;
146#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
147 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
148 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
149#endif
150
151 if (!extend)
152 {
153 /* start with empty packet ... */
154 if (left == 0)
155 rb->offset = align;
156 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
157 {
158 /* check if next packet length is large
159 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
160 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
161 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
162 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
163 {
164 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
165 * and its length field is insane, we can
166 * only be led to wrong decision about
167 * whether memmove will occur or not.
168 * Header values has no effect on memmove
169 * arguments and therefore no buffer
170 * overrun can be triggered. */
171 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
172 rb->offset = align;
173 }
174 }
175 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
176 s->packet_length = 0;
177 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
178 }
179
180 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
181 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
182 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
183 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
184 {
185 if (left > 0 && n > left)
186 n = left;
187 }
188
189 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
190 if (left >= n)
191 {
192 s->packet_length+=n;
193 rb->left=left-n;
194 rb->offset+=n;
195 return(n);
196 }
197
198 /* else we need to read more data */
199
200 len = s->packet_length;
201 pkt = rb->buf+align;
202 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
203 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
204 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
205 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
206 {
207 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
208 s->packet = pkt;
209 rb->offset = len + align;
210 }
211
212 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
213 {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 return -1;
216 }
217
218 if (!s->read_ahead)
219 /* ignore max parameter */
220 max = n;
221 else
222 {
223 if (max < n)
224 max = n;
225 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
226 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
227 }
228
229 while (left < n)
230 {
231 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
232 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
233 * len+max if possible) */
234
235 clear_sys_error();
236 if (s->rbio != NULL)
237 {
238 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
239 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
240 }
241 else
242 {
243 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
244 i = -1;
245 }
246
247 if (i <= 0)
248 {
249 rb->left = left;
250 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
251 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
252 if (len+left == 0)
253 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
254 return(i);
255 }
256 left+=i;
257 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
258 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
259 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
260 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
261 {
262 if (n > left)
263 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
264 }
265 }
266
267 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
268 rb->offset += n;
269 rb->left = left - n;
270 s->packet_length += n;
271 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
272 return(n);
273 }
274
275/* Call this to get a new input record.
276 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
277 * or non-blocking IO.
278 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
281 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
282 */
283/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
284static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
285 {
286 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
287 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
288 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
289 SSL_SESSION *sess;
290 unsigned char *p;
291 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
292 short version;
293 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
294 size_t extra;
295
296 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
297 sess=s->session;
298
299 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
300 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
301 else
302 extra=0;
303 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
304 {
305 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
306 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
308 return -1;
309 }
310
311again:
312 /* check if we have the header */
313 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
314 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
315 {
316 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
317 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
318 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
319
320 p=s->packet;
321
322 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
323 rr->type= *(p++);
324 ssl_major= *(p++);
325 ssl_minor= *(p++);
326 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
327 n2s(p,rr->length);
328#if 0
329fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
330#endif
331
332 /* Lets check version */
333 if (!s->first_packet)
334 {
335 if (version != s->version)
336 {
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
338 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
339 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
340 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
341 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
342 goto f_err;
343 }
344 }
345
346 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
347 {
348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
349 goto err;
350 }
351
352 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
353 {
354 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
356 goto f_err;
357 }
358
359 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
360 }
361
362 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
363
364 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
365 {
366 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
367 i=rr->length;
368 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
369 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
370 /* now n == rr->length,
371 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
372 }
373
374 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
375
376 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
377 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
378 */
379 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
380
381 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
382 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
383 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
384 * the decryption or by the decompression
385 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
386 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
387
388 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
389 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
390
391 /* check is not needed I believe */
392 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
393 {
394 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
396 goto f_err;
397 }
398
399 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
400 rr->data=rr->input;
401
402 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
403 /* enc_err is:
404 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
405 * 1: if the padding is valid
406 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
407 if (enc_err == 0)
408 {
409 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
410 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
411 goto f_err;
412 }
413
414#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
415printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
416{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
417printf("\n");
418#endif
419
420 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
421 if ((sess != NULL) &&
422 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
423 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
424 {
425 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
426 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
427 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
428 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
429 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
430
431 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
432 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
433
434 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
435 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
436 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
437 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
438 */
439 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
440 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
441 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
442 orig_len < mac_size+1))
443 {
444 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
446 goto f_err;
447 }
448
449 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
450 {
451 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
452 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
453 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
454 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
455 * */
456 mac = mac_tmp;
457 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
458 rr->length -= mac_size;
459 }
460 else
461 {
462 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
463 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
464 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
465 rr->length -= mac_size;
466 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
467 }
468
469 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
470 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
471 enc_err = -1;
472 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
473 enc_err = -1;
474 }
475
476 if (enc_err < 0)
477 {
478 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
479 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
480 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
481 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
482 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
483 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
485 goto f_err;
486 }
487
488 /* r->length is now just compressed */
489 if (s->expand != NULL)
490 {
491 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
492 {
493 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
494 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
495 goto f_err;
496 }
497 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
498 {
499 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
501 goto f_err;
502 }
503 }
504
505 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
506 {
507 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
508 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
509 goto f_err;
510 }
511
512 rr->off=0;
513 /* So at this point the following is true
514 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
515 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
516 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
517 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
518 * after use :-).
519 */
520
521 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
522 s->packet_length=0;
523
524 /* just read a 0 length packet */
525 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
526
527#if 0
528fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
529#endif
530
531 return(1);
532
533f_err:
534 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
535err:
536 return(ret);
537 }
538
539int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
540 {
541#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
542 int i;
543 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
544
545 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
546 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
547 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
548 if (i < 0)
549 return(0);
550 else
551 rr->length=i;
552 rr->data=rr->comp;
553#endif
554 return(1);
555 }
556
557int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
558 {
559#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
560 int i;
561 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
562
563 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
564 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
565 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
566 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
567 if (i < 0)
568 return(0);
569 else
570 wr->length=i;
571
572 wr->input=wr->data;
573#endif
574 return(1);
575 }
576
577/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
578 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
579 */
580int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
581 {
582 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
583 unsigned int n,nw;
584 int i,tot;
585
586 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
587 OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX);
588 tot=s->s3->wnum;
589 s->s3->wnum=0;
590
591 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
592 {
593 i=s->handshake_func(s);
594 if (i < 0) return(i);
595 if (i == 0)
596 {
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
598 return -1;
599 }
600 }
601
602 /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write
603 * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete
604 * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding
605 * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as
606 * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large
607 * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users
608 * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user
609 * will notice
610 */
611 if (len < tot)
612 {
613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
614 return(-1);
615 }
616
617
618 n=(len-tot);
619 for (;;)
620 {
621 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
622 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
623 else
624 nw=n;
625
626 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
627 if (i <= 0)
628 {
629 s->s3->wnum=tot;
630 return i;
631 }
632
633 if ((i == (int)n) ||
634 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
635 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
636 {
637 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
638 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
639 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
640
641 return tot+i;
642 }
643
644 n-=i;
645 tot+=i;
646 }
647 }
648
649static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
650 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
651 {
652 unsigned char *p,*plen;
653 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
654 int prefix_len=0;
655 long align=0;
656 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
657 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
658 SSL_SESSION *sess;
659
660
661 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
662 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
663 if (wb->left != 0)
664 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
665
666 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
667 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
668 {
669 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
670 if (i <= 0)
671 return(i);
672 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
673 }
674
675 if (wb->buf == NULL)
676 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
677 return -1;
678
679 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
680 return 0;
681
682 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
683 sess=s->session;
684
685 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
686 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
687 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
688 clear=1;
689
690 if (clear)
691 mac_size=0;
692 else
693 {
694 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
695 if (mac_size < 0)
696 goto err;
697 }
698
699 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
700 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
701 {
702 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
703 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
704
705 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
706 {
707 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
708 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
709 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
710 * together with the actual payload) */
711 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
712 if (prefix_len <= 0)
713 goto err;
714
715 if (prefix_len >
716 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
717 {
718 /* insufficient space */
719 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
720 goto err;
721 }
722 }
723
724 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
725 }
726
727 if (create_empty_fragment)
728 {
729#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
730 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
731 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
732 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
733 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
734 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
735 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
736#endif
737 p = wb->buf + align;
738 wb->offset = align;
739 }
740 else if (prefix_len)
741 {
742 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
743 }
744 else
745 {
746#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
747 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
748 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
749#endif
750 p = wb->buf + align;
751 wb->offset = align;
752 }
753
754 /* write the header */
755
756 *(p++)=type&0xff;
757 wr->type=type;
758
759 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
760 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
761
762 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
763 plen=p;
764 p+=2;
765
766 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
767 wr->data=p;
768 wr->length=(int)len;
769 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
770
771 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
772 * wr->data */
773
774 /* first we compress */
775 if (s->compress != NULL)
776 {
777 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
778 {
779 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
780 goto err;
781 }
782 }
783 else
784 {
785 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
786 wr->input=wr->data;
787 }
788
789 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
790 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
791 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
792
793 if (mac_size != 0)
794 {
795 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
796 goto err;
797 wr->length+=mac_size;
798 wr->input=p;
799 wr->data=p;
800 }
801
802 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
803 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
804
805 /* record length after mac and block padding */
806 s2n(wr->length,plen);
807
808 /* we should now have
809 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
810 * wr->length long */
811 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
812 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
813
814 if (create_empty_fragment)
815 {
816 /* we are in a recursive call;
817 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
818 */
819 return wr->length;
820 }
821
822 /* now let's set up wb */
823 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
824
825 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
826 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
827 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
828 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
829 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
830
831 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
832 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
833err:
834 return -1;
835 }
836
837/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
838int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
839 unsigned int len)
840 {
841 int i;
842 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
843
844/* XXXX */
845 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
846 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
847 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
848 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
849 {
850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
851 return(-1);
852 }
853
854 for (;;)
855 {
856 clear_sys_error();
857 if (s->wbio != NULL)
858 {
859 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
860 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
861 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
862 (unsigned int)wb->left);
863 }
864 else
865 {
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
867 i= -1;
868 }
869 if (i == wb->left)
870 {
871 wb->left=0;
872 wb->offset+=i;
873 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
874 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
875 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
876 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
877 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
878 }
879 else if (i <= 0) {
880 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
881 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
882 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
883 point in using a datagram service */
884 wb->left = 0;
885 }
886 return(i);
887 }
888 wb->offset+=i;
889 wb->left-=i;
890 }
891 }
892
893/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
894 * 'type' is one of the following:
895 *
896 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
897 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
898 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
899 *
900 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
901 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
902 *
903 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
904 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
905 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
906 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
907 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
908 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
909 * Change cipher spec protocol
910 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
911 * Alert protocol
912 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
913 * Handshake protocol
914 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
915 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
916 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
917 * Application data protocol
918 * none of our business
919 */
920int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
921 {
922 int al,i,j,ret;
923 unsigned int n;
924 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
925 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
926
927 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
928 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
929 return(-1);
930
931 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) ||
932 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
933 {
934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
935 return -1;
936 }
937
938 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
939 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
940 {
941 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
942 unsigned char *dst = buf;
943 unsigned int k;
944
945 /* peek == 0 */
946 n = 0;
947 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
948 {
949 *dst++ = *src++;
950 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
951 n++;
952 }
953 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
954 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
955 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
956 return n;
957 }
958
959 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
960
961 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
962 {
963 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
964 i=s->handshake_func(s);
965 if (i < 0) return(i);
966 if (i == 0)
967 {
968 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
969 return(-1);
970 }
971 }
972start:
973 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
974
975 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
976 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
977 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
978 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
979 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
980
981 /* get new packet if necessary */
982 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
983 {
984 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
985 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
986 }
987
988 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
989
990 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
991 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
992 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
993 {
994 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
995 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
996 goto f_err;
997 }
998
999 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1000 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1001 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1002 {
1003 rr->length=0;
1004 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1005 return(0);
1006 }
1007
1008
1009 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1010 {
1011 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1012 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1013 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1014 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1015 {
1016 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1018 goto f_err;
1019 }
1020
1021 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1022
1023 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1024 n = rr->length;
1025 else
1026 n = (unsigned int)len;
1027
1028 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1029 if (!peek)
1030 {
1031 rr->length-=n;
1032 rr->off+=n;
1033 if (rr->length == 0)
1034 {
1035 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1036 rr->off=0;
1037 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
1038 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1039 }
1040 }
1041 return(n);
1042 }
1043
1044
1045 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1046 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1047
1048 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1049 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1050 */
1051 {
1052 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1053 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1054 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1055
1056 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1057 {
1058 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1059 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1060 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1061 }
1062 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1063 {
1064 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1065 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1066 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1067 }
1068
1069 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1070 {
1071 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1072 if (rr->length < n)
1073 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1074
1075 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1076 while (n-- > 0)
1077 {
1078 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1079 rr->length--;
1080 }
1081
1082 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1083 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1084 }
1085 }
1086
1087 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1088 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1089 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1090
1091 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1092 if ((!s->server) &&
1093 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1094 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1095 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1096 {
1097 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1098
1099 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1100 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1101 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1102 {
1103 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1105 goto f_err;
1106 }
1107
1108 if (s->msg_callback)
1109 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1110
1111 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1112 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1113 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1114 {
1115 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1116 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1117 {
1118 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1119 if (i < 0) return(i);
1120 if (i == 0)
1121 {
1122 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1123 return(-1);
1124 }
1125
1126 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1127 {
1128 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1129 {
1130 BIO *bio;
1131 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1132 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1133 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1134 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1135 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1136 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1137 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1138 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1139 return(-1);
1140 }
1141 }
1142 }
1143 }
1144 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1145 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1146 goto start;
1147 }
1148 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1149 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1150 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1151 */
1152 if (s->server &&
1153 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1154 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1155 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1156 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1157 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1158 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1159 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1160
1161 {
1162 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1163 rr->length = 0;
1164 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1165 goto start;
1166 }
1167 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1168 {
1169 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1170 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1171
1172 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1173
1174 if (s->msg_callback)
1175 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1176
1177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1178 cb=s->info_callback;
1179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1181
1182 if (cb != NULL)
1183 {
1184 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1185 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1186 }
1187
1188 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1189 {
1190 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1191 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1192 {
1193 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1194 return(0);
1195 }
1196 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1197 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1198 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1199 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1200 * expects it to succeed.
1201 *
1202 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1203 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1204 */
1205 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1206 {
1207 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1208 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1209 goto f_err;
1210 }
1211 }
1212 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1213 {
1214 char tmp[16];
1215
1216 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1217 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1219 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1220 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1221 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1222 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1223 return(0);
1224 }
1225 else
1226 {
1227 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1229 goto f_err;
1230 }
1231
1232 goto start;
1233 }
1234
1235 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1236 {
1237 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1238 rr->length=0;
1239 return(0);
1240 }
1241
1242 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1243 {
1244 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1245 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1246 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1247 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1248 {
1249 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1251 goto f_err;
1252 }
1253
1254 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1255 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1256 {
1257 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1259 goto f_err;
1260 }
1261
1262 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK))
1263 {
1264 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1266 goto f_err;
1267 }
1268
1269 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1270
1271 rr->length=0;
1272
1273 if (s->msg_callback)
1274 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1275
1276 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1277 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1278 goto err;
1279 else
1280 goto start;
1281 }
1282
1283 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1284 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1285 {
1286 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1287 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1288 {
1289#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1290 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1291 * protocol violations): */
1292 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1293 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1294 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1295#else
1296 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1297#endif
1298 s->new_session=1;
1299 }
1300 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1301 if (i < 0) return(i);
1302 if (i == 0)
1303 {
1304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1305 return(-1);
1306 }
1307
1308 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1309 {
1310 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1311 {
1312 BIO *bio;
1313 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1314 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1315 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1316 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1317 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1318 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1319 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1320 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1321 return(-1);
1322 }
1323 }
1324 goto start;
1325 }
1326
1327 switch (rr->type)
1328 {
1329 default:
1330#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1331 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1332 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1333 {
1334 rr->length = 0;
1335 goto start;
1336 }
1337#endif
1338 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1340 goto f_err;
1341 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1342 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1343 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1344 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1345 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1346 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1347 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1348 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1349 goto f_err;
1350 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1351 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1352 * but have application data. If the library was
1353 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1354 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1355 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1356 * we will indulge it.
1357 */
1358 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1359 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1360 ((
1361 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1362 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1363 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1364 ) || (
1365 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1366 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1367 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1368 )
1369 ))
1370 {
1371 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1372 return(-1);
1373 }
1374 else
1375 {
1376 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1378 goto f_err;
1379 }
1380 }
1381 /* not reached */
1382
1383f_err:
1384 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1385err:
1386 return(-1);
1387 }
1388
1389int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1390 {
1391 int i;
1392 const char *sender;
1393 int slen;
1394
1395 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1396 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1397 else
1398 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1399
1400 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1401 {
1402 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0)
1403 {
1404 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1406 return (0);
1407 }
1408
1409 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1410 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1411 }
1412
1413 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1414 return(0);
1415
1416 /* we have to record the message digest at
1417 * this point so we can get it before we read
1418 * the finished message */
1419 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1420 {
1421 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1422 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1423 }
1424 else
1425 {
1426 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1427 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1428 }
1429
1430 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1431 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1432
1433 return(1);
1434 }
1435
1436int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1437 {
1438 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1439 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1440 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1441 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1442 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1443 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1444 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1445 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1446
1447 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1448 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1449 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1450 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1451 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1452 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1453 * some time in the future */
1454 return -1;
1455 }
1456
1457int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1458 {
1459 int i,j;
1460 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1461
1462 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1463 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1464 if (i <= 0)
1465 {
1466 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1467 }
1468 else
1469 {
1470 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1471 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1472 * we will not worry too much. */
1473 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1474 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1475
1476 if (s->msg_callback)
1477 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1478
1479 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1480 cb=s->info_callback;
1481 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1482 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1483
1484 if (cb != NULL)
1485 {
1486 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1487 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1488 }
1489 }
1490 return(i);
1491 }
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