source: vendor/current/source4/kdc/db-glue.c@ 740

Last change on this file since 740 was 740, checked in by Silvan Scherrer, 12 years ago

Samba Server: update vendor to 3.6.0
File size: 52.7 KB
Line 
1/*
2 Unix SMB/CIFS implementation.
3
4 Database Glue between Samba and the KDC
5
6 Copyright (C) Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org> 2005-2009
7 Copyright (C) Simo Sorce <idra@samba.org> 2010
8
9 This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
12 (at your option) any later version.
13
14 This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 GNU General Public License for more details.
18
19
20 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
21 along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
22*/
23
24#include "includes.h"
25#include "libcli/security/security.h"
26#include "auth/auth.h"
27#include "auth/auth_sam.h"
28#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
29#include "dsdb/common/util.h"
30#include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_drsblobs.h"
31#include "param/param.h"
32#include "../lib/crypto/md4.h"
33#include "system/kerberos.h"
34#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
35#include <hdb.h>
36#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
37#include "kdc/kdc-policy.h"
38
39#define SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno) \
40 ((uint16_t)(((uint32_t)kvno) >> 16))
41
42#define SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, krbtgt) \
43 ((krb5_kvno)((((uint32_t)kvno) & 0xFFFF) | \
44 ((((uint32_t)krbtgt) << 16) & 0xFFFF0000)))
45
46enum samba_kdc_ent_type
47{ SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
48 SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_TRUST, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY };
49
50enum trust_direction {
51 UNKNOWN = 0,
52 INBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_INBOUND,
53 OUTBOUND = LSA_TRUST_DIRECTION_OUTBOUND
54};
55
56static const char *trust_attrs[] = {
57 "trustPartner",
58 "trustAuthIncoming",
59 "trustAuthOutgoing",
60 "whenCreated",
61 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
62 "trustAttributes",
63 "trustDirection",
64 "trustType",
65 NULL
66};
67
68static KerberosTime ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(struct ldb_message *msg, const char *attr, KerberosTime default_val)
69{
70 const char *tmp;
71 const char *gentime;
72 struct tm tm;
73
74 gentime = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, attr, NULL);
75 if (!gentime)
76 return default_val;
77
78 tmp = strptime(gentime, "%Y%m%d%H%M%SZ", &tm);
79 if (tmp == NULL) {
80 return default_val;
81 }
82
83 return timegm(&tm);
84}
85
86static HDBFlags uf2HDBFlags(krb5_context context, uint32_t userAccountControl, enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type)
87{
88 HDBFlags flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
89
90 /* we don't allow kadmin deletes */
91 flags.immutable = 1;
92
93 /* mark the principal as invalid to start with */
94 flags.invalid = 1;
95
96 flags.renewable = 1;
97
98 /* All accounts are servers, but this may be disabled again in the caller */
99 flags.server = 1;
100
101 /* Account types - clear the invalid bit if it turns out to be valid */
102 if (userAccountControl & UF_NORMAL_ACCOUNT) {
103 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
104 flags.client = 1;
105 }
106 flags.invalid = 0;
107 }
108
109 if (userAccountControl & UF_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
110 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
111 flags.client = 1;
112 }
113 flags.invalid = 0;
114 }
115 if (userAccountControl & UF_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
116 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
117 flags.client = 1;
118 }
119 flags.invalid = 0;
120 }
121 if (userAccountControl & UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT) {
122 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY) {
123 flags.client = 1;
124 }
125 flags.invalid = 0;
126 }
127
128 /* Not permitted to act as a client if disabled */
129 if (userAccountControl & UF_ACCOUNTDISABLE) {
130 flags.client = 0;
131 }
132 if (userAccountControl & UF_LOCKOUT) {
133 flags.invalid = 1;
134 }
135/*
136 if (userAccountControl & UF_PASSWORD_NOTREQD) {
137 flags.invalid = 1;
138 }
139*/
140/*
141 UF_PASSWORD_CANT_CHANGE and UF_ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PASSWORD_ALLOWED are irrelevent
142*/
143 if (userAccountControl & UF_TEMP_DUPLICATE_ACCOUNT) {
144 flags.invalid = 1;
145 }
146
147/* UF_DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD and UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY handled in samba_kdc_message2entry() */
148
149/*
150 if (userAccountControl & UF_MNS_LOGON_ACCOUNT) {
151 flags.invalid = 1;
152 }
153*/
154 if (userAccountControl & UF_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED) {
155 flags.require_hwauth = 1;
156 }
157 if (userAccountControl & UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION) {
158 flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
159 }
160 if (!(userAccountControl & UF_NOT_DELEGATED)) {
161 flags.forwardable = 1;
162 flags.proxiable = 1;
163 }
164
165 if (userAccountControl & UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) {
166 flags.require_preauth = 0;
167 } else {
168 flags.require_preauth = 1;
169
170 }
171 return flags;
172}
173
174static int samba_kdc_entry_destructor(struct samba_kdc_entry *p)
175{
176 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex = p->entry_ex;
177 free_hdb_entry(&entry_ex->entry);
178 return 0;
179}
180
181static void samba_kdc_free_entry(krb5_context context, hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
182{
183 /* this function is called only from hdb_free_entry().
184 * Make sure we neutralize the destructor or we will
185 * get a double free later when hdb_free_entry() will
186 * try to call free_hdb_entry() */
187 talloc_set_destructor(entry_ex->ctx, NULL);
188
189 /* now proceed to free the talloc part */
190 talloc_free(entry_ex->ctx);
191}
192
193static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(krb5_context context,
194 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
195 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
196 struct ldb_message *msg,
197 uint32_t rid,
198 bool is_rodc,
199 uint32_t userAccountControl,
200 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
201 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
202{
203 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
204 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
205 struct samr_Password *hash;
206 const struct ldb_val *sc_val;
207 struct supplementalCredentialsBlob scb;
208 struct supplementalCredentialsPackage *scpk = NULL;
209 bool newer_keys = false;
210 struct package_PrimaryKerberosBlob _pkb;
211 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr3 *pkb3 = NULL;
212 struct package_PrimaryKerberosCtr4 *pkb4 = NULL;
213 uint16_t i;
214 uint16_t allocated_keys = 0;
215 int rodc_krbtgt_number = 0;
216 int kvno = 0;
217 uint32_t supported_enctypes
218 = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg,
219 "msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes",
220 0);
221
222 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT || is_rodc) {
223 /* KDCs (and KDCs on RODCs) use AES */
224 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
225 } else if (userAccountControl & (UF_PARTIAL_SECRETS_ACCOUNT|UF_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
226 /* DCs and RODCs comptuer accounts use AES */
227 supported_enctypes |= ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES128 | ENC_HMAC_SHA1_96_AES256;
228 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT ||
229 (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY)) {
230 /* for AS-REQ the client chooses the enc types it
231 * supports, and this will vary between computers a
232 * user logs in from.
233 *
234 * likewise for 'any' return as much as is supported,
235 * to export into a keytab */
236 supported_enctypes = ENC_ALL_TYPES;
237 }
238
239 /* If UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY has been set, then don't allow use of the newer enc types */
240 if (userAccountControl & UF_USE_DES_KEY_ONLY) {
241 supported_enctypes = ENC_CRC32|ENC_RSA_MD5;
242 } else {
243 /* Otherwise, add in the default enc types */
244 supported_enctypes |= ENC_CRC32 | ENC_RSA_MD5 | ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5;
245 }
246
247 /* Is this the krbtgt or a RODC krbtgt */
248 if (is_rodc) {
249 rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
250
251 if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
252 return EINVAL;
253 }
254 }
255
256 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
257 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
258
259 kvno = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-KeyVersionNumber", 0);
260 if (is_rodc) {
261 kvno = SAMBA_KVNO_AND_KRBTGT(kvno, rodc_krbtgt_number);
262 }
263 entry_ex->entry.kvno = kvno;
264
265 /* Get keys from the db */
266
267 hash = samdb_result_hash(mem_ctx, msg, "unicodePwd");
268 sc_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "supplementalCredentials");
269
270 /* unicodePwd for enctype 0x17 (23) if present */
271 if (hash) {
272 allocated_keys++;
273 }
274
275 /* supplementalCredentials if present */
276 if (sc_val) {
277 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all(sc_val, mem_ctx, &scb,
278 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_supplementalCredentialsBlob);
279 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
280 dump_data(0, sc_val->data, sc_val->length);
281 ret = EINVAL;
282 goto out;
283 }
284
285 if (scb.sub.signature != SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIALS_SIGNATURE) {
286 NDR_PRINT_DEBUG(supplementalCredentialsBlob, &scb);
287 ret = EINVAL;
288 goto out;
289 }
290
291 for (i=0; i < scb.sub.num_packages; i++) {
292 if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
293 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
294 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
295 scpk = NULL;
296 continue;
297 }
298 newer_keys = true;
299 break;
300 } else if (strcmp("Primary:Kerberos", scb.sub.packages[i].name) == 0) {
301 scpk = &scb.sub.packages[i];
302 if (!scpk->data || !scpk->data[0]) {
303 scpk = NULL;
304 }
305 /*
306 * we don't break here in hope to find
307 * a Kerberos-Newer-Keys package
308 */
309 }
310 }
311 }
312 /*
313 * Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys or Primary:Kerberos element
314 * of supplementalCredentials
315 */
316 if (scpk) {
317 DATA_BLOB blob;
318
319 blob = strhex_to_data_blob(mem_ctx, scpk->data);
320 if (!blob.data) {
321 ret = ENOMEM;
322 goto out;
323 }
324
325 /* we cannot use ndr_pull_struct_blob_all() here, as w2k and w2k3 add padding bytes */
326 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(&blob, mem_ctx, &_pkb,
327 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_package_PrimaryKerberosBlob);
328 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
329 ret = EINVAL;
330 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
331 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse package_PrimaryKerberosBlob");
332 goto out;
333 }
334
335 if (newer_keys && _pkb.version != 4) {
336 ret = EINVAL;
337 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
338 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys not version 4");
339 goto out;
340 }
341
342 if (!newer_keys && _pkb.version != 3) {
343 ret = EINVAL;
344 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
345 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_message2entry_keys: could not parse Primary:Kerberos not version 3");
346 goto out;
347 }
348
349 if (_pkb.version == 4) {
350 pkb4 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr4;
351 allocated_keys += pkb4->num_keys;
352 } else if (_pkb.version == 3) {
353 pkb3 = &_pkb.ctr.ctr3;
354 allocated_keys += pkb3->num_keys;
355 }
356 }
357
358 if (allocated_keys == 0) {
359 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
360 /* We are on an RODC, but don't have keys for this account. Signal this to the caller */
361 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
362 }
363
364 /* oh, no password. Apparently (comment in
365 * hdb-ldap.c) this violates the ASN.1, but this
366 * allows an entry with no keys (yet). */
367 return 0;
368 }
369
370 /* allocate space to decode into */
371 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
372 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(allocated_keys, sizeof(Key));
373 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
374 ret = ENOMEM;
375 goto out;
376 }
377
378 if (hash && (supported_enctypes & ENC_RC4_HMAC_MD5)) {
379 Key key;
380
381 key.mkvno = 0;
382 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
383
384 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
385 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
386 hash->hash, sizeof(hash->hash),
387 &key.key);
388 if (ret) {
389 goto out;
390 }
391
392 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
393 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
394 }
395
396 if (pkb4) {
397 for (i=0; i < pkb4->num_keys; i++) {
398 Key key;
399
400 if (!pkb4->keys[i].value) continue;
401
402 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb4->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
403 continue;
404 }
405
406 key.mkvno = 0;
407 key.salt = NULL;
408
409 if (pkb4->salt.string) {
410 DATA_BLOB salt;
411
412 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb4->salt.string);
413
414 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
415 if (key.salt == NULL) {
416 ret = ENOMEM;
417 goto out;
418 }
419
420 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
421
422 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
423 if (ret) {
424 free(key.salt);
425 key.salt = NULL;
426 goto out;
427 }
428 }
429
430 /* TODO: maybe pass the iteration_count somehow... */
431
432 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
433 pkb4->keys[i].keytype,
434 pkb4->keys[i].value->data,
435 pkb4->keys[i].value->length,
436 &key.key);
437 if (ret == KRB5_PROG_ETYPE_NOSUPP) {
438 DEBUG(2,("Unsupported keytype ignored - type %u\n",
439 pkb4->keys[i].keytype));
440 ret = 0;
441 continue;
442 }
443 if (ret) {
444 if (key.salt) {
445 free_Salt(key.salt);
446 free(key.salt);
447 key.salt = NULL;
448 }
449 goto out;
450 }
451
452 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
453 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
454 }
455 } else if (pkb3) {
456 for (i=0; i < pkb3->num_keys; i++) {
457 Key key;
458
459 if (!pkb3->keys[i].value) continue;
460
461 if (!(kerberos_enctype_to_bitmap(pkb3->keys[i].keytype) & supported_enctypes)) {
462 continue;
463 }
464
465 key.mkvno = 0;
466 key.salt = NULL;
467
468 if (pkb3->salt.string) {
469 DATA_BLOB salt;
470
471 salt = data_blob_string_const(pkb3->salt.string);
472
473 key.salt = calloc(1, sizeof(*key.salt));
474 if (key.salt == NULL) {
475 ret = ENOMEM;
476 goto out;
477 }
478
479 key.salt->type = hdb_pw_salt;
480
481 ret = krb5_data_copy(&key.salt->salt, salt.data, salt.length);
482 if (ret) {
483 free(key.salt);
484 key.salt = NULL;
485 goto out;
486 }
487 }
488
489 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
490 pkb3->keys[i].keytype,
491 pkb3->keys[i].value->data,
492 pkb3->keys[i].value->length,
493 &key.key);
494 if (ret) {
495 if (key.salt) {
496 free_Salt(key.salt);
497 free(key.salt);
498 key.salt = NULL;
499 }
500 goto out;
501 }
502
503 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
504 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
505 }
506 }
507
508out:
509 if (ret != 0) {
510 entry_ex->entry.keys.len = 0;
511 }
512 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.len == 0 && entry_ex->entry.keys.val) {
513 free(entry_ex->entry.keys.val);
514 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = NULL;
515 }
516 return ret;
517}
518
519/*
520 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
521 */
522static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_message2entry(krb5_context context,
523 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
524 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
525 enum samba_kdc_ent_type ent_type,
526 unsigned flags,
527 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
528 struct ldb_message *msg,
529 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
530{
531 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
532 uint32_t userAccountControl;
533 unsigned int i;
534 krb5_error_code ret = 0;
535 krb5_boolean is_computer = FALSE;
536
537 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
538 NTTIME acct_expiry;
539 NTSTATUS status;
540
541 uint32_t rid;
542 bool is_rodc = false;
543 struct ldb_message_element *objectclasses;
544 struct ldb_val computer_val;
545 const char *samAccountName = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "samAccountName", NULL);
546 computer_val.data = discard_const_p(uint8_t,"computer");
547 computer_val.length = strlen((const char *)computer_val.data);
548
549 if (ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber")) {
550 is_rodc = true;
551 }
552
553 if (!samAccountName) {
554 ret = ENOENT;
555 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_message2entry: no samAccountName present");
556 goto out;
557 }
558
559 objectclasses = ldb_msg_find_element(msg, "objectClass");
560
561 if (objectclasses && ldb_msg_find_val(objectclasses, &computer_val)) {
562 is_computer = TRUE;
563 }
564
565 memset(entry_ex, 0, sizeof(*entry_ex));
566
567 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
568 if (!p) {
569 ret = ENOMEM;
570 goto out;
571 }
572
573 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
574 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
575 p->realm_dn = talloc_reference(p, realm_dn);
576 if (!p->realm_dn) {
577 ret = ENOMEM;
578 goto out;
579 }
580
581 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
582
583 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
584 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
585
586 entry_ex->ctx = p;
587 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
588
589 userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
590
591
592 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
593 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY && principal == NULL) {
594 krb5_make_principal(context, &entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), samAccountName, NULL);
595 } else {
596 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
597 if (ret) {
598 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
599 goto out;
600 }
601
602 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
603 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
604 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
605 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
606 * we determine from our records */
607
608 /* this has to be with malloc() */
609 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
610 }
611
612 /* First try and figure out the flags based on the userAccountControl */
613 entry_ex->entry.flags = uf2HDBFlags(context, userAccountControl, ent_type);
614
615 /* Windows 2008 seems to enforce this (very sensible) rule by
616 * default - don't allow offline attacks on a user's password
617 * by asking for a ticket to them as a service (encrypted with
618 * their probably patheticly insecure password) */
619
620 if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server
621 && lpcfg_parm_bool(lp_ctx, NULL, "kdc", "require spn for service", true)) {
622 if (!is_computer && !ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "servicePrincipalName", NULL)) {
623 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 0;
624 }
625 }
626
627 if (flags & HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA) {
628 /* These (created_by, modified_by) parts of the entry are not relevant for Samba4's use
629 * of the Heimdal KDC. They are stored in a the traditional
630 * DB for audit purposes, and still form part of the structure
631 * we must return */
632
633 /* use 'whenCreated' */
634 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
635 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
636 krb5_make_principal(context,
637 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
638 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
639
640 entry_ex->entry.modified_by = (Event *) malloc(sizeof(Event));
641 if (entry_ex->entry.modified_by == NULL) {
642 ret = ENOMEM;
643 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "malloc: out of memory");
644 goto out;
645 }
646
647 /* use 'whenChanged' */
648 entry_ex->entry.modified_by->time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenChanged", 0);
649 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
650 krb5_make_principal(context,
651 &entry_ex->entry.modified_by->principal,
652 lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), "kadmin", NULL);
653 }
654
655
656 /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
657 * virtue of being that particular RID */
658 status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
659
660 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
661 ret = EINVAL;
662 goto out;
663 }
664
665 if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
666 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
667 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
668
669 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
670 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
671
672 /* Don't mark all requests for the krbtgt/realm as
673 * 'change password', as otherwise we could get into
674 * trouble, and not enforce the password expirty.
675 * Instead, only do it when request is for the kpasswd service */
676 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER
677 && principal->name.name_string.len == 2
678 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "kadmin") == 0)
679 && (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], "changepw") == 0)
680 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)) {
681 entry_ex->entry.flags.change_pw = 1;
682 }
683 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
684 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
685 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 1;
686 } else if (is_rodc) {
687 /* The RODC krbtgt account is like the main krbtgt,
688 * but it does not have a changepw or kadmin
689 * service */
690
691 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
692 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
693
694 /* Also don't allow the RODC krbtgt to be a client (it should not be needed) */
695 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
696 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
697 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
698
699 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
700 entry_ex->entry.flags.forwardable = 1;
701 entry_ex->entry.flags.ok_as_delegate = 0;
702 } else if (entry_ex->entry.flags.server && ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
703 /* The account/password expiry only applies when the account is used as a
704 * client (ie password login), not when used as a server */
705
706 /* Make very well sure we don't use this for a client,
707 * it could bypass the password restrictions */
708 entry_ex->entry.flags.client = 0;
709
710 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
711 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
712
713 } else {
714 NTTIME must_change_time
715 = samdb_result_force_password_change(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
716 realm_dn, msg);
717 if (must_change_time == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
718 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
719 } else {
720 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.pw_end));
721 if (entry_ex->entry.pw_end == NULL) {
722 ret = ENOMEM;
723 goto out;
724 }
725 *entry_ex->entry.pw_end = nt_time_to_unix(must_change_time);
726 }
727
728 acct_expiry = samdb_result_account_expires(msg);
729 if (acct_expiry == 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) {
730 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = NULL;
731 } else {
732 entry_ex->entry.valid_end = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.valid_end));
733 if (entry_ex->entry.valid_end == NULL) {
734 ret = ENOMEM;
735 goto out;
736 }
737 *entry_ex->entry.valid_end = nt_time_to_unix(acct_expiry);
738 }
739 }
740
741 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
742
743 entry_ex->entry.max_life = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
744 if (entry_ex->entry.max_life == NULL) {
745 ret = ENOMEM;
746 goto out;
747 }
748
749 if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER) {
750 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime);
751 } else if (ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT || ent_type == SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT) {
752 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime);
753 } else {
754 *entry_ex->entry.max_life = MIN(nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.service_tkt_lifetime),
755 nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_lifetime));
756 }
757
758 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = malloc(sizeof(*entry_ex->entry.max_life));
759 if (entry_ex->entry.max_renew == NULL) {
760 ret = ENOMEM;
761 goto out;
762 }
763
764 *entry_ex->entry.max_renew = nt_time_to_unix(kdc_db_ctx->policy.user_tkt_renewaltime);
765
766 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
767
768 /* Get keys from the db */
769 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry_keys(context, kdc_db_ctx, p, msg,
770 rid, is_rodc, userAccountControl,
771 ent_type, entry_ex);
772 if (ret) {
773 /* Could be bougus data in the entry, or out of memory */
774 goto out;
775 }
776
777 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
778 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
779 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
780 ret = ENOMEM;
781 goto out;
782 }
783 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
784 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
785 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
786 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
787 ret = ENOMEM;
788 goto out;
789 }
790 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
791 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
792 }
793
794
795 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
796
797out:
798 if (ret != 0) {
799 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
800 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
801 } else {
802 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
803 }
804
805 return ret;
806}
807
808/*
809 * Construct an hdb_entry from a directory entry.
810 */
811static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(krb5_context context,
812 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
813 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, krb5_const_principal principal,
814 enum trust_direction direction,
815 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
816 struct ldb_message *msg,
817 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
818{
819 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
820 const char *dnsdomain;
821 const char *realm = lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx);
822 DATA_BLOB password_utf16;
823 struct samr_Password password_hash;
824 const struct ldb_val *password_val;
825 struct trustAuthInOutBlob password_blob;
826 struct samba_kdc_entry *p;
827
828 enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
829 int ret, trust_direction_flags;
830 unsigned int i;
831
832 p = talloc(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
833 if (!p) {
834 ret = ENOMEM;
835 goto out;
836 }
837
838 p->kdc_db_ctx = kdc_db_ctx;
839 p->entry_ex = entry_ex;
840 p->realm_dn = realm_dn;
841
842 talloc_set_destructor(p, samba_kdc_entry_destructor);
843
844 /* make sure we do not have bogus data in there */
845 memset(&entry_ex->entry, 0, sizeof(hdb_entry));
846
847 entry_ex->ctx = p;
848 entry_ex->free_entry = samba_kdc_free_entry;
849
850 /* use 'whenCreated' */
851 entry_ex->entry.created_by.time = ldb_msg_find_krb5time_ldap_time(msg, "whenCreated", 0);
852 /* use 'kadmin' for now (needed by mit_samba) */
853 krb5_make_principal(context,
854 &entry_ex->entry.created_by.principal,
855 realm, "kadmin", NULL);
856
857 entry_ex->entry.valid_start = NULL;
858
859 trust_direction_flags = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "trustDirection", 0);
860
861 if (direction == INBOUND) {
862 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthIncoming");
863
864 } else { /* OUTBOUND */
865 dnsdomain = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, "trustPartner", NULL);
866 /* replace realm */
867 realm = strupper_talloc(mem_ctx, dnsdomain);
868 password_val = ldb_msg_find_ldb_val(msg, "trustAuthOutgoing");
869 }
870
871 if (!password_val || !(trust_direction_flags & direction)) {
872 ret = ENOENT;
873 goto out;
874 }
875
876 ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob(password_val, mem_ctx, &password_blob,
877 (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_trustAuthInOutBlob);
878 if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
879 ret = EINVAL;
880 goto out;
881 }
882
883 entry_ex->entry.kvno = -1;
884 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
885 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_VERSION) {
886 entry_ex->entry.kvno = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.version.version;
887 }
888 }
889
890 for (i=0; i < password_blob.count; i++) {
891 if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_CLEAR) {
892 password_utf16 = data_blob_const(password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.password,
893 password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.clear.size);
894 /* In the future, generate all sorts of
895 * hashes, but for now we can't safely convert
896 * the random strings windows uses into
897 * utf8 */
898
899 /* but as it is utf16 already, we can get the NT password/arcfour-hmac-md5 key */
900 mdfour(password_hash.hash, password_utf16.data, password_utf16.length);
901 break;
902 } else if (password_blob.current.array[i].AuthType == TRUST_AUTH_TYPE_NT4OWF) {
903 password_hash = password_blob.current.array[i].AuthInfo.nt4owf.password;
904 break;
905 }
906 }
907
908 if (i < password_blob.count) {
909 Key key;
910 /* Must have found a cleartext or MD4 password */
911 entry_ex->entry.keys.val = calloc(1, sizeof(Key));
912
913 key.mkvno = 0;
914 key.salt = NULL; /* No salt for this enc type */
915
916 if (entry_ex->entry.keys.val == NULL) {
917 ret = ENOMEM;
918 goto out;
919 }
920
921 ret = krb5_keyblock_init(context,
922 ENCTYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC,
923 password_hash.hash, sizeof(password_hash.hash),
924 &key.key);
925
926 entry_ex->entry.keys.val[entry_ex->entry.keys.len] = key;
927 entry_ex->entry.keys.len++;
928 }
929
930 entry_ex->entry.principal = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.principal)));
931
932 ret = copy_Principal(principal, entry_ex->entry.principal);
933 if (ret) {
934 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
935 goto out;
936 }
937
938 /* While we have copied the client principal, tests
939 * show that Win2k3 returns the 'corrected' realm, not
940 * the client-specified realm. This code attempts to
941 * replace the client principal's realm with the one
942 * we determine from our records */
943
944 krb5_principal_set_realm(context, entry_ex->entry.principal, realm);
945 entry_ex->entry.flags = int2HDBFlags(0);
946 entry_ex->entry.flags.immutable = 1;
947 entry_ex->entry.flags.invalid = 0;
948 entry_ex->entry.flags.server = 1;
949 entry_ex->entry.flags.require_preauth = 1;
950
951 entry_ex->entry.pw_end = NULL;
952
953 entry_ex->entry.max_life = NULL;
954
955 entry_ex->entry.max_renew = NULL;
956
957 entry_ex->entry.generation = NULL;
958
959 entry_ex->entry.etypes = malloc(sizeof(*(entry_ex->entry.etypes)));
960 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes == NULL) {
961 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
962 ret = ENOMEM;
963 goto out;
964 }
965 entry_ex->entry.etypes->len = entry_ex->entry.keys.len;
966 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val = calloc(entry_ex->entry.etypes->len, sizeof(int));
967 if (entry_ex->entry.etypes->val == NULL) {
968 krb5_clear_error_message(context);
969 ret = ENOMEM;
970 goto out;
971 }
972 for (i=0; i < entry_ex->entry.etypes->len; i++) {
973 entry_ex->entry.etypes->val[i] = entry_ex->entry.keys.val[i].key.keytype;
974 }
975
976
977 p->msg = talloc_steal(p, msg);
978
979out:
980 if (ret != 0) {
981 /* This doesn't free ent itself, that is for the eventual caller to do */
982 hdb_free_entry(context, entry_ex);
983 } else {
984 talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, entry_ex->ctx);
985 }
986
987 return ret;
988
989}
990
991static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_trust(krb5_context context, struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx,
992 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
993 const char *realm,
994 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn,
995 struct ldb_message **pmsg)
996{
997 int lret;
998 krb5_error_code ret;
999 char *filter = NULL;
1000 const char * const *attrs = trust_attrs;
1001
1002 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1003 filter = talloc_asprintf(mem_ctx, "(&(objectClass=trustedDomain)(|(flatname=%s)(trustPartner=%s)))", realm, realm);
1004
1005 if (!filter) {
1006 ret = ENOMEM;
1007 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc_asprintf: out of memory");
1008 return ret;
1009 }
1010
1011 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, mem_ctx, &res,
1012 ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx),
1013 LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, attrs, "%s", filter);
1014 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1015 DEBUG(3, ("Failed to search for %s: %s\n", filter, ldb_errstring(ldb_ctx)));
1016 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1017 } else if (res->count == 0 || res->count > 1) {
1018 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a single entry for %s: got %d\n", filter, res->count));
1019 talloc_free(res);
1020 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1021 }
1022 talloc_steal(mem_ctx, res->msgs);
1023 *pmsg = res->msgs[0];
1024 talloc_free(res);
1025 return 0;
1026}
1027
1028static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_client(krb5_context context,
1029 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1030 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1031 krb5_const_principal principal,
1032 const char **attrs,
1033 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1034 struct ldb_message **msg) {
1035 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1036 char *principal_string;
1037 krb5_error_code ret;
1038
1039 ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, principal, &principal_string);
1040
1041 if (ret != 0) {
1042 return ret;
1043 }
1044
1045 nt_status = sam_get_results_principal(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1046 mem_ctx, principal_string, attrs,
1047 realm_dn, msg);
1048 free(principal_string);
1049 if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER)) {
1050 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1051 } else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY)) {
1052 return ENOMEM;
1053 } else if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1054 return EINVAL;
1055 }
1056
1057 return ret;
1058}
1059
1060static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_client(krb5_context context,
1061 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1062 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1063 krb5_const_principal principal,
1064 unsigned flags,
1065 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex) {
1066 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1067 krb5_error_code ret;
1068 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1069
1070 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1071 mem_ctx, principal, user_attrs,
1072 &realm_dn, &msg);
1073 if (ret != 0) {
1074 return ret;
1075 }
1076
1077 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1078 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_CLIENT,
1079 flags,
1080 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1081 return ret;
1082}
1083
1084static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(krb5_context context,
1085 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1086 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1087 krb5_const_principal principal,
1088 unsigned flags,
1089 uint32_t krbtgt_number,
1090 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1091{
1092 struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx;
1093 krb5_error_code ret;
1094 struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
1095 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1096
1097 krb5_principal alloc_principal = NULL;
1098 if (principal->name.name_string.len != 2
1099 || (strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_TGS_NAME) != 0)) {
1100 /* Not a krbtgt */
1101 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1102 }
1103
1104 /* krbtgt case. Either us or a trusted realm */
1105
1106 if (lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->realm)
1107 && lpcfg_is_my_domain_or_realm(lp_ctx, principal->name.name_string.val[1])) {
1108 /* us, or someone quite like us */
1109 /* Cludge, cludge cludge. If the realm part of krbtgt/realm,
1110 * is in our db, then direct the caller at our primary
1111 * krbtgt */
1112
1113 int lret;
1114
1115 if (krbtgt_number == kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1116 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1117 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1118 krbtgt_attrs, 0,
1119 "(objectClass=user)");
1120 } else {
1121 /* We need to look up an RODC krbtgt (perhaps
1122 * ours, if we are an RODC, perhaps another
1123 * RODC if we are a read-write DC */
1124 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx,
1125 &msg, realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1126 krbtgt_attrs,
1127 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1128 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=%u))", (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1129 }
1130
1131 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1132 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1133 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1134 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1135 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1136 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1137 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1138 } else if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1139 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1140 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1141 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY,
1142 "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find KRBTGT number %u in DB!",
1143 (unsigned)(krbtgt_number));
1144 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1145 }
1146
1147 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1148 ret = krb5_copy_principal(context, principal, &alloc_principal);
1149 if (ret) {
1150 return ret;
1151 }
1152
1153 /* When requested to do so, ensure that the
1154 * both realm values in the principal are set
1155 * to the upper case, canonical realm */
1156 free(alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1157 alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1] = strdup(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx));
1158 if (!alloc_principal->name.name_string.val[1]) {
1159 ret = ENOMEM;
1160 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: strdup() failed!");
1161 return ret;
1162 }
1163 principal = alloc_principal;
1164 }
1165
1166 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1167 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_KRBTGT,
1168 flags, realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1169 if (flags & HDB_F_CANON) {
1170 /* This is again copied in the message2entry call */
1171 krb5_free_principal(context, alloc_principal);
1172 }
1173 if (ret != 0) {
1174 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: self krbtgt message2entry failed");
1175 }
1176 return ret;
1177
1178 } else {
1179 enum trust_direction direction = UNKNOWN;
1180 const char *realm = NULL;
1181
1182 /* Either an inbound or outbound trust */
1183
1184 if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->realm) == 0) {
1185 /* look for inbound trust */
1186 direction = INBOUND;
1187 realm = principal->name.name_string.val[1];
1188 } else if (strcasecmp(lpcfg_realm(lp_ctx), principal->name.name_string.val[1]) == 0) {
1189 /* look for outbound trust */
1190 direction = OUTBOUND;
1191 realm = principal->realm;
1192 } else {
1193 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1194 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1195 krb5_set_error_message(context, HDB_ERR_NOENTRY, "samba_kdc_fetch: not our realm for trusts ('%s', '%s')",
1196 principal->realm, principal->name.name_string.val[1]);
1197 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1198 }
1199
1200 /* Trusted domains are under CN=system */
1201
1202 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_trust(context, kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1203 mem_ctx,
1204 realm, realm_dn, &msg);
1205
1206 if (ret != 0) {
1207 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1208 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: could not find principal in DB");
1209 return ret;
1210 }
1211
1212 ret = samba_kdc_trust_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1213 principal, direction,
1214 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1215 if (ret != 0) {
1216 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: trust_message2entry failed");
1217 }
1218 return ret;
1219 }
1220
1221}
1222
1223static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_lookup_server(krb5_context context,
1224 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1225 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1226 krb5_const_principal principal,
1227 const char **attrs,
1228 struct ldb_dn **realm_dn,
1229 struct ldb_message **msg)
1230{
1231 krb5_error_code ret;
1232 if (principal->name.name_string.len >= 2) {
1233 /* 'normal server' case */
1234 int ldb_ret;
1235 NTSTATUS nt_status;
1236 struct ldb_dn *user_dn;
1237 char *principal_string;
1238
1239 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal,
1240 KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM,
1241 &principal_string);
1242 if (ret != 0) {
1243 return ret;
1244 }
1245
1246 /* At this point we may find the host is known to be
1247 * in a different realm, so we should generate a
1248 * referral instead */
1249 nt_status = crack_service_principal_name(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1250 mem_ctx, principal_string,
1251 &user_dn, realm_dn);
1252 free(principal_string);
1253
1254 if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) {
1255 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1256 }
1257
1258 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb,
1259 mem_ctx,
1260 msg, user_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1261 attrs, DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN, "(objectClass=*)");
1262 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1263 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1264 }
1265
1266 } else {
1267 int lret;
1268 char *filter = NULL;
1269 char *short_princ;
1270 const char *realm;
1271 /* server as client principal case, but we must not lookup userPrincipalNames */
1272 *realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb);
1273 realm = krb5_principal_get_realm(context, principal);
1274
1275 /* TODO: Check if it is our realm, otherwise give referall */
1276
1277 ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, principal, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &short_princ);
1278
1279 if (ret != 0) {
1280 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1281 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_lookup_principal: could not parse principal");
1282 return ret;
1283 }
1284
1285 lret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, mem_ctx, msg,
1286 *realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1287 attrs,
1288 DSDB_SEARCH_SHOW_EXTENDED_DN,
1289 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=%s))",
1290 ldb_binary_encode_string(mem_ctx, short_princ));
1291 free(short_princ);
1292 if (lret == LDB_ERR_NO_SUCH_OBJECT) {
1293 DEBUG(3, ("Failed find a entry for %s\n", filter));
1294 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1295 }
1296 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1297 DEBUG(3, ("Failed single search for for %s - %s\n",
1298 filter, ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1299 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1300 }
1301 }
1302
1303 return 0;
1304}
1305
1306static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch_server(krb5_context context,
1307 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1308 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
1309 krb5_const_principal principal,
1310 unsigned flags,
1311 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1312{
1313 krb5_error_code ret;
1314 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1315 struct ldb_message *msg;
1316
1317 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal,
1318 server_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1319 if (ret != 0) {
1320 return ret;
1321 }
1322
1323 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1324 principal, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_SERVER,
1325 flags,
1326 realm_dn, msg, entry_ex);
1327 if (ret != 0) {
1328 krb5_warnx(context, "samba_kdc_fetch: message2entry failed");
1329 }
1330
1331 return ret;
1332}
1333
1334krb5_error_code samba_kdc_fetch(krb5_context context,
1335 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1336 krb5_const_principal principal,
1337 unsigned flags,
1338 krb5_kvno kvno,
1339 hdb_entry_ex *entry_ex)
1340{
1341 krb5_error_code ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1342 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1343 unsigned int krbtgt_number;
1344 if (flags & HDB_F_KVNO_SPECIFIED) {
1345 krbtgt_number = SAMBA_KVNO_GET_KRBTGT(kvno);
1346 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1347 if (krbtgt_number != kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
1348 return HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE;
1349 }
1350 }
1351 } else {
1352 krbtgt_number = kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number;
1353 }
1354
1355 mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_fetch context");
1356 if (!mem_ctx) {
1357 ret = ENOMEM;
1358 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1359 return ret;
1360 }
1361
1362 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_CLIENT) {
1363 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_client(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1364 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1365 }
1366 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_SERVER) {
1367 /* krbtgt fits into this situation for trusted realms, and for resolving different versions of our own realm name */
1368 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1369 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1370
1371 /* We return 'no entry' if it does not start with krbtgt/, so move to the common case quickly */
1372 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, entry_ex);
1373 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1374 }
1375 if (flags & HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT) {
1376 ret = samba_kdc_fetch_krbtgt(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, principal, flags, krbtgt_number, entry_ex);
1377 if (ret != HDB_ERR_NOENTRY) goto done;
1378 }
1379
1380done:
1381 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1382 return ret;
1383}
1384
1385struct samba_kdc_seq {
1386 unsigned int index;
1387 unsigned int count;
1388 struct ldb_message **msgs;
1389 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1390};
1391
1392static krb5_error_code samba_kdc_seq(krb5_context context,
1393 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1394 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1395{
1396 krb5_error_code ret;
1397 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1398 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1399 hdb_entry_ex entry_ex;
1400 memset(&entry_ex, '\0', sizeof(entry_ex));
1401
1402 if (!priv) {
1403 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1404 }
1405
1406 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_seq context");
1407
1408 if (!mem_ctx) {
1409 ret = ENOMEM;
1410 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_seq: talloc_named() failed!");
1411 return ret;
1412 }
1413
1414 if (priv->index < priv->count) {
1415 ret = samba_kdc_message2entry(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx,
1416 NULL, SAMBA_KDC_ENT_TYPE_ANY,
1417 HDB_F_ADMIN_DATA|HDB_F_GET_ANY,
1418 priv->realm_dn, priv->msgs[priv->index++], entry);
1419 } else {
1420 ret = HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1421 }
1422
1423 if (ret != 0) {
1424 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1425 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1426 } else {
1427 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1428 }
1429
1430 return ret;
1431}
1432
1433krb5_error_code samba_kdc_firstkey(krb5_context context,
1434 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1435 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1436{
1437 struct ldb_context *ldb_ctx = kdc_db_ctx->samdb;
1438 struct samba_kdc_seq *priv = kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx;
1439 char *realm;
1440 struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
1441 krb5_error_code ret;
1442 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx;
1443 int lret;
1444
1445 if (priv) {
1446 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1447 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1448 }
1449
1450 priv = (struct samba_kdc_seq *) talloc(kdc_db_ctx, struct samba_kdc_seq);
1451 if (!priv) {
1452 ret = ENOMEM;
1453 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "talloc: out of memory");
1454 return ret;
1455 }
1456
1457 priv->index = 0;
1458 priv->msgs = NULL;
1459 priv->realm_dn = ldb_get_default_basedn(ldb_ctx);
1460 priv->count = 0;
1461
1462 mem_ctx = talloc_named(priv, 0, "samba_kdc_firstkey context");
1463
1464 if (!mem_ctx) {
1465 ret = ENOMEM;
1466 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_firstkey: talloc_named() failed!");
1467 return ret;
1468 }
1469
1470 ret = krb5_get_default_realm(context, &realm);
1471 if (ret != 0) {
1472 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1473 return ret;
1474 }
1475
1476 lret = ldb_search(ldb_ctx, priv, &res,
1477 priv->realm_dn, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE, user_attrs,
1478 "(objectClass=user)");
1479
1480 if (lret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1481 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1482 return HDB_ERR_NOENTRY;
1483 }
1484
1485 priv->count = res->count;
1486 priv->msgs = talloc_steal(priv, res->msgs);
1487 talloc_free(res);
1488
1489 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = priv;
1490
1491 ret = samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1492
1493 if (ret != 0) {
1494 TALLOC_FREE(priv);
1495 kdc_db_ctx->seq_ctx = NULL;
1496 } else {
1497 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1498 }
1499 return ret;
1500}
1501
1502krb5_error_code samba_kdc_nextkey(krb5_context context,
1503 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1504 hdb_entry_ex *entry)
1505{
1506 return samba_kdc_seq(context, kdc_db_ctx, entry);
1507}
1508
1509/* Check if a given entry may delegate or do s4u2self to this target principal
1510 *
1511 * This is currently a very nasty hack - allowing only delegation to itself.
1512 *
1513 * This is shared between the constrained delegation and S4U2Self code.
1514 */
1515krb5_error_code
1516samba_kdc_check_identical_client_and_server(krb5_context context,
1517 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1518 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1519 krb5_const_principal target_principal)
1520{
1521 krb5_error_code ret;
1522 krb5_principal enterprise_prinicpal = NULL;
1523 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1524 struct ldb_message *msg;
1525 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1526 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1527 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1528 const char *delegation_check_attrs[] = {
1529 "objectSid", NULL
1530 };
1531
1532 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation");
1533
1534 if (!mem_ctx) {
1535 ret = ENOMEM;
1536 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1537 return ret;
1538 }
1539
1540 if (target_principal->name.name_type == KRB5_NT_ENTERPRISE_PRINCIPAL) {
1541 /* Need to reparse the enterprise principal to find the real target */
1542 if (target_principal->name.name_string.len != 1) {
1543 ret = KRB5_PARSE_MALFORMED;
1544 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_check_constrained_delegation: request for delegation to enterprise principal with wrong (%d) number of components",
1545 target_principal->name.name_string.len);
1546 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1547 return ret;
1548 }
1549 ret = krb5_parse_name(context, target_principal->name.name_string.val[0],
1550 &enterprise_prinicpal);
1551 if (ret) {
1552 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1553 return ret;
1554 }
1555 target_principal = enterprise_prinicpal;
1556 }
1557
1558 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_server(context, kdc_db_ctx, mem_ctx, target_principal,
1559 delegation_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1560
1561 krb5_free_principal(context, enterprise_prinicpal);
1562
1563 if (ret != 0) {
1564 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1565 return ret;
1566 }
1567
1568 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1569 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1570
1571 /* Allow delegation to the same principal, even if by a different
1572 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1573 * comparison */
1574 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1575 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1576 return KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1577 }
1578
1579 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1580 return ret;
1581}
1582
1583/* Certificates printed by a the Certificate Authority might have a
1584 * slightly different form of the user principal name to that in the
1585 * database. Allow a mismatch where they both refer to the same
1586 * SID */
1587
1588krb5_error_code
1589samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match(krb5_context context,
1590 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx,
1591 hdb_entry_ex *entry,
1592 krb5_const_principal certificate_principal)
1593{
1594 krb5_error_code ret;
1595 struct ldb_dn *realm_dn;
1596 struct ldb_message *msg;
1597 struct dom_sid *orig_sid;
1598 struct dom_sid *target_sid;
1599 struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(entry->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
1600 const char *ms_upn_check_attrs[] = {
1601 "objectSid", NULL
1602 };
1603
1604 TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_named(kdc_db_ctx, 0, "samba_kdc_check_pkinit_ms_upn_match");
1605
1606 if (!mem_ctx) {
1607 ret = ENOMEM;
1608 krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "samba_kdc_fetch: talloc_named() failed!");
1609 return ret;
1610 }
1611
1612 ret = samba_kdc_lookup_client(context, kdc_db_ctx,
1613 mem_ctx, certificate_principal,
1614 ms_upn_check_attrs, &realm_dn, &msg);
1615
1616 if (ret != 0) {
1617 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1618 return ret;
1619 }
1620
1621 orig_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid");
1622 target_sid = samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, msg, "objectSid");
1623
1624 /* Consider these to be the same principal, even if by a different
1625 * name. The easy and safe way to prove this is by SID
1626 * comparison */
1627 if (!(orig_sid && target_sid && dom_sid_equal(orig_sid, target_sid))) {
1628 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1629 return KRB5_KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
1630 }
1631
1632 talloc_free(mem_ctx);
1633 return ret;
1634}
1635
1636NTSTATUS samba_kdc_setup_db_ctx(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_base_context *base_ctx,
1637 struct samba_kdc_db_context **kdc_db_ctx_out)
1638{
1639 int ldb_ret;
1640 struct ldb_message *msg;
1641 struct auth_session_info *session_info;
1642 struct samba_kdc_db_context *kdc_db_ctx;
1643 /* The idea here is very simple. Using Kerberos to
1644 * authenticate the KDC to the LDAP server is higly likely to
1645 * be circular.
1646 *
1647 * In future we may set this up to use EXERNAL and SSL
1648 * certificates, for now it will almost certainly be NTLMSSP_SET_USERNAME
1649 */
1650
1651 kdc_db_ctx = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct samba_kdc_db_context);
1652 if (kdc_db_ctx == NULL) {
1653 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
1654 }
1655 kdc_db_ctx->ev_ctx = base_ctx->ev_ctx;
1656 kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx = base_ctx->lp_ctx;
1657
1658 kdc_get_policy(base_ctx->lp_ctx, NULL, &kdc_db_ctx->policy);
1659
1660 session_info = system_session(kdc_db_ctx->lp_ctx);
1661 if (session_info == NULL) {
1662 return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1663 }
1664
1665 /* Setup the link to LDB */
1666 kdc_db_ctx->samdb = samdb_connect(kdc_db_ctx, base_ctx->ev_ctx,
1667 base_ctx->lp_ctx, session_info, 0);
1668 if (kdc_db_ctx->samdb == NULL) {
1669 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot open samdb for KDC backend!"));
1670 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1671 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1672 }
1673
1674 /* Find out our own krbtgt kvno */
1675 ldb_ret = samdb_rodc(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, &kdc_db_ctx->rodc);
1676 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1677 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine if we are an RODC in KDC backend: %s\n",
1678 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1679 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1680 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1681 }
1682 if (kdc_db_ctx->rodc) {
1683 int my_krbtgt_number;
1684 const char *secondary_keytab[] = { "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", NULL };
1685 struct ldb_dn *account_dn;
1686 struct ldb_dn *server_dn = samdb_server_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx);
1687 if (!server_dn) {
1688 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server DN in KDC backend: %s\n",
1689 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1690 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1691 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1692 }
1693
1694 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, server_dn,
1695 "serverReference", &account_dn);
1696 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1697 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine server account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1698 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1699 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1700 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1701 }
1702
1703 ldb_ret = samdb_reference_dn(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx, account_dn,
1704 "msDS-KrbTgtLink", &kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn);
1705 talloc_free(account_dn);
1706 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1707 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot determine RODC krbtgt account in KDC backend: %s\n",
1708 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1709 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1710 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1711 }
1712
1713 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1714 &msg, kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn, LDB_SCOPE_BASE,
1715 secondary_keytab,
1716 0,
1717 "(&(objectClass=user)(msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber=*))");
1718 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1719 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read krbtgt account %s in KDC backend to get msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber: %s: %s\n",
1720 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1721 ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb),
1722 ldb_strerror(ldb_ret)));
1723 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1724 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1725 }
1726 my_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
1727 if (my_krbtgt_number == -1) {
1728 DEBUG(1, ("hdb_samba4_create: Cannot read msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber from krbtgt account %s in KDC backend: got %d\n",
1729 ldb_dn_get_linearized(kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn),
1730 my_krbtgt_number));
1731 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1732 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1733 }
1734 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = my_krbtgt_number;
1735
1736 } else {
1737 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1738 ldb_ret = dsdb_search_one(kdc_db_ctx->samdb, kdc_db_ctx,
1739 &msg, NULL, LDB_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
1740 krbtgt_attrs,
1741 0,
1742 "(&(objectClass=user)(samAccountName=krbtgt))");
1743
1744 if (ldb_ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
1745 DEBUG(1, ("samba_kdc_fetch: could not find own KRBTGT in DB: %s\n", ldb_errstring(kdc_db_ctx->samdb)));
1746 talloc_free(kdc_db_ctx);
1747 return NT_STATUS_CANT_ACCESS_DOMAIN_INFO;
1748 }
1749 kdc_db_ctx->krbtgt_dn = talloc_steal(kdc_db_ctx, msg->dn);
1750 kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number = 0;
1751 talloc_free(msg);
1752 }
1753 *kdc_db_ctx_out = kdc_db_ctx;
1754 return NT_STATUS_OK;
1755}
Note: See TracBrowser for help on using the repository browser.